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ABSTRACT 
In contrast to guilt based reciprocity, which hypothesizes that reciprocity is an 
increasing function of the 2
nd order expectation of trustor’s expectation for 
reciprocation, we test for reciprocity which is a decreasing function of trustees 2
nd 
order expectations, i.e., that people can reciprocate out of gratitude. To 
unambiguously decrease 2
nd order expectations in our treatment, we broke up a 
standard trust game into a two stage dictator game where the 1
st round dictator 
was not informed about the possibility of a 2
nd  round. Furthermore, the 2
nd 
dictator could “silently exit” by not sending anything to the 1
st round dictator. We 
found a significant increase in both the amount of reciprocation and the number of 
people reciprocating as compared to our standard trust and dictator games 
controls. The strength of the positive reciprocity observed rules out inequality 
aversion as a cause. We found support for our hypothesis in the prior data of 
others who tested for guilt based reciprocity. Our result also seems to reconcile 
conflicting results in that literature. To our knowledge, this is the first paper 
which shows that kindness distinct from guilt, shame, efficiency and inequity 
aversion could be a motive for reciprocity. Our strong positive reciprocity result 
also suggests why it has been difficult to find in the past. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The importance of reciprocity has long been recognized in economics, particularly in 
contracting when institutions of legal enforcement are underdeveloped or absent, e.g., in 
emerging markets, or in social settings where contracts are implicit and informal. Prior 
experimental literature has largely demonstrated that people are not entirely selfish (in the 
colloquial sense of the word). However, as Charness and Rabin (2002) pointed out, 
evidence for positive reciprocity, where recipients of favor respond more generously than 
dictators with the same amount of endowment, has been elusive. They regarded McCabe 
et al., (2003) as a notable exception in the literature. However, even in that experiment, 
inequity aversion and psychological motives like guilt and shame, which are not 
obviously forms of positive reciprocity, are still possible confounds. These psychological 
confounds could also explain why positive reciprocity has been difficult to find in other 
experiments where beliefs had generally not been the focus of the experiment and hence, 
were not well controlled. In standard gift exchange or trust experiments, recipients could 
believe that the sender gave in order to incite reciprocation. In that case, the recipients 
might have doubts about the senders’ generous motives and hence, might feel that 
positive reciprocity was not warranted. Thus, we believe that a test of positive reciprocity 
would have to control the 2
nd order beliefs of recipients. We focused upon reciprocating 
behavior that is a decreasing function of those 2
nd order expectations. This is our 
interpretation of what is commonly meant by “gratitude”
3 or “thankfulness.” In contrast, 
the current literature on belief based reciprocity has largely focused on “guilt,” which has 
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been modeled as an increasing function of the beliefs of the receiver/trustee in gift 
exchange/ trust games.  
In this somewhat extended introduction and literature review, we discuss the 
problems and anomalies in this literature first in order to motivate both our hypothesis of 
gratitude and our somewhat radical methodology for measuring it. We argue that these 
largely center around the difficulties of controlling 2
nd order beliefs when players are 
fully aware of the game structure. We also show that though prior work tested for an 
alternative hypothesis, we are able to find support for our hypothesis in their data. We 
then discuss the implications of our study for why positive reciprocity has been difficult 
to find.  
The guilt based reciprocity literature hypothesizes that people reciprocate out of 
disappointment aversion. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006; hereafter, CD) showed that 
the making of cheap talk promises prior to trust games were correlated with the average 
giving of trustors, and the average reciprocation by trustees. Furthermore, average 
trustees’ 2
nd order belief in reciprocation is correlated with average reciprocation by 
trustees. However, CD did not reveal the actual beliefs of trustors to the trustees with 
whom they were paired. Thus, they could not establish causation. Ellingsen et al. (2010) 
in an attempt to establish causation, revealed the actual belief of each trustor to a paired 
trustee. They found that the trustor’s belief had no significant effect on the paired 
trustee’s reciprocation, seemly refuting the guilt based reciprocity hypothesis. Particularly 
interesting for our gratitude hypothesis was the fact that the majority of trustees who 
faced the most pessimistic beliefs of trustors reciprocated the most. This suggests a 
counter-guilt factor consistent with our gratitude based reciprocation hypothesis.  
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Reuben et al. (2009) tested the guilt based reciprocation hypothesis with a different 
design. To get trustors to truthfully reveal their expectations to trustees, Ellingsen et al. 
(2010) did not tell trustors that their beliefs would be revealed to trustees. To get trustees 
to believe that trustors had been truthful, they told the fact of the omission to trustees. 
Reuben et al. (2009) did not use asymmetric instructions, which might cause trustees to 
question whether the experimenter had been forthright with them as well. Subjects played 
twice in each role of sender and receiver. Reuben et al. (2009) elicited subjects’ beliefs 
when they were senders during a round when beliefs were unused, and then used them in 
the 2
nd round. Reuben et al. (2009) also used significantly higher payments for both belief 
elicitation and for actual play. They did find a significant correlation between revealed 
beliefs of trustors and the reciprocating behavior of the paired trustees. However, even 
here when beliefs were well controlled, about 10% of subjects went in the opposite 
direction predicted by guilt in each of their pessimistic and optimistic belief treatments.  
Stanca et al.’s (2007) study of intrinsic motivation suppressed 2
nd order beliefs in a 
non-equilibrium setting. In their setup, the 1
st player was not informed of the possibility 
of reciprocation in the 2
nd stage. Hence, their 2
nd player could not discount the kindness 
intent of 1
st player giving as being merely done in anticipation of reciprocation. They 
found significantly increased positive reciprocation as compared to their full information 
control for their strategy elicitation (though not for their decision method elicitation). 
However, with respect our hypothesis, this design does not indentify gratitude since guilt 
is still a possible confound. They controlled for guilt from ex-ante but not ex-post 
expectations. The 1
st dictator was informed of the game structure in the 2
nd stage. Guilt of 
the 2
nd player was still possible from the disappointment of ex-post expectations. Hence, 
aversion to possible disappointment could still drive reciprocation. Furthermore,  
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unrelated to their hypothesis, but relevant to our gratitude hypothesis, people could 
reciprocate from shame. There was no “silent exiting” (Dana et al., 2006). Subjects could 
not give 0 or low and not be noticed. The design was also not double-blind. Subjects 
might be motivated by shame from experimenter or other subjects knowing about non-
reciprocation (Hoffman et al., 1994, 1996).  
We adopted a design similar to Stanca et al., but had more controls for the above 
mentioned confounds, and found strong evidence for positive reciprocity. In contrast to 
Stanca et al., the proportion of subjects who reciprocated, as well as the proportion of 
endowment given back by our recipients who received a positive transfer, was 
significantly higher than both our dictator and standard trust games control.  
Furthermore, our results for this apparent positive reciprocity were less likely to have 
been motivated by guilt as might have been the case in Stanca et al. or inequity aversion, 
efficiency, or shame, as might have been the case in (McCabe et al., 2003). As in Stanca 
et al., we controlled for guilt from anticipation of disappointing ex-post expectation by 
also not informing the 1
st round dictator of the possibility of a 2
nd round. However, we 
also further diminished the possibility of guilt from ex-post beliefs by permitting implicit 
silent exiting with our payment procedure. Inequity aversion as the motive for 
reciprocation was ruled out in the results.  
The fact that trustees gave significantly more when they were less sure that they 
were expected to reciprocate suggests that guilt crowds out gratitude. This could help 
explain the conflicting results in Ellingsen et al. 2010 and Reuben et al. 2009, as well as 
the scarcity of results on positive reciprocity in prior experiments mentioned by Charness 
and Rabin (2002). First, the opposition between these belief based incentives of guilt and  
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gratitude could make guilt experiments very sensitive to the beliefs of subjects. Similar 
experiments are likely to yield conflicting results for even slightly different setups. 
Secondly, if guilt can crowd out gratitude, trustees could discount the generosity of 
trustors giving as motivated by anticipation of reciprocation. This could help explain the 
paucity of evidence for positive reciprocity. 
II.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
We highlight the novel part of the design first before going into details. We used the 
decision method of elicitation. To avoid strategic behavior, we gave our subjects 
instructions step-by-step. We broke the trust game into a two stage dictator game. The 1
st 
stage dictator (1
st dictator) was not informed of the 2
nd stage to prevent the 1
st dictator 
from giving to incite guilt, and also to prevent the 2
nd dictator believing that it was the 1
st 
dictator’s motive in giving. The 2
nd stage dictator (2
nd dictator) was informed of the game 
structure and the 1
st dictator’s lack of knowledge of the 2
nd round, and thus also of the 
possibility of reciprocation by the 2
nd dictator. To avoid guilt from ex-post expectations, 
the 2
nd dictator was told that the 1st dictator would not be informed about the source of 
the money, which we sent by electronic bank transfer with the money which they did not 
give to the 2
nd dictator.   
The following is a summary of the procedures. Please refer to the game tree in 
Figure 1. 
In Stage 1, subjects were told that they could divide 20 CNY with another player 
and that the remainder would be sent to their bank account in 3-4 days. Hence, dictator 
1’s payoff was 20-x, where x was the amount sent to dictator 2. As mentioned, the  
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dictator 1s’ were not informed of possibility that the 2
nd dictators could reciprocate. The 
payment was through a non-descript electronic deposit which the 1
st dictators might not 
even notice as including an extra payment.  
In Stage 2, the 2
nd dictators received 3*transfer from the 1
st dictator + show-up fee 
of 5 CNY. Then the 2
nd dictators could decide to give something back. Hence, dictator 2s 
got 3x+5-y, where y was the amount sent to dictator 1s. Dictator 1’s final payment was 
20-x+y.  
Dictator 2s were informed that the 1
st stage dictators were not informed about 
possibility of reciprocation. Reciprocated money was sent with the stage 1 payment to 
dictator 1. The 2
nd dictators took what money they did not give back upon leaving the 
experiment. 
 




The experiment involved 90 subjects recruited from graduate students at Shenzhen 
University Town. For the main treatment, 70 subjects were put into 35 pairs in the two 
stage dictator game. “Control 1” is the decision of the 1
st dictators (while the main 
treatment was the decision of the 2
nd dictator). The other 20 subjects were in the standard 
trust game. “Control 2” is the decision of these trustees. Figure 2 shows the main forms 
that subjects filled out. We elicited the factual 2
nd order beliefs of the trustees in control 2 
as to the expectations of the trustor. We also elicited the counterfactual 2
nd order beliefs of 
the 2
nd dictators about the first dictators expectations for reciprocation had they known 
about the 2
nd stage in the treatment.  See appendix A for the translation of the instructions. 
 
FIGURE 2. FORMS USED IN THE EXPERIMENT 




III.  MAIN RESULTS 
The summary of our main results is as follows. In our control 1, 22/35=63% of our 
1st dictators gave a positive amount. This is the standard result. The mean giving (ratio of 
the average) of these subjects was 4. 4/20 CNY =22% (same as the average of the ratio). 
In control 2, 8/10=80% of these trustees in this standard trust game reciprocated. Mean 
giving was 6.3/21.5 CNY=29%, with the average of the ratio being 31%. However, in the 
treatment, 22/22=100% of the 2nd dictators who received positive transfers from the 1st 
dictator reciprocated
4. Mean giving: 10.8/26 CNY=41%, with the average of the ratio 
being 39%. The difference in mean giving to the trust game control was significant at the 
5% level, while that to the 1st stage dictator game was significant at the 1%. Inequity 
aversion was also ruled out by the result. 2/35=5.7% of the 1st dictator gave more than 
half of their endowment. (Only these 1
st dictators could have thought they were poorer 
than their 2
nd dictator pair, given that they did not know their transfer would be multiplied 
by 3 and have 5 CNY added.) However, 17/22=77% of the 2
nd dictators who received a 
positive amount from 1st dictators were poorer than their 1st dictator pair, after giving. 
These 2
nd dictators knew the true payoffs of the 1st dictators. This rules out inequity 
aversion as their motive for giving. The ratios of transfers and the average ratios of each 
                                                 
4 There was one 1
st dictator who transferred 0.1 CNY. Since 0.1 is much closer to 0 than any other positive 
transfers, we did not include the 2
nd dictator who received this 0.1 into the data of 2
nd dictators who 
received amounts greater than 0.  
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treatment group are shown in Figure 3. 
 
FIGURE 3. RATE OF TRANSFER 
We also tested for the guilt sensitivity of all subjects using a standard test from 
psychology, the TOSCA-3. See Tangney et al., 2002 for details. We gave them the test in 
part as a distracter since they might have found it strange to get “money for nothing”. We 
found no significant correlation between guilt sensitivity either in 1st dictator giving, or 
in 2
nd dictators reciprocation, or trustees reciprocation in the standard trust game. The 
lack of significance of the 2
nd dictator reciprocation would be predicted if gratitude is 
something distinct from guilt. The lack of significance with 1
st dictator giving could be 
due to irrelevance of guilt as a motive. The lack of significance with trustee giving in the 
standard trust game could be due to small sample size, which in this case was 10 subjects.    
IV.  DISCUSSION 
Our results are significantly stronger than Stanca et al. (2007)’s results. There, 
identical with us, 1





















































nd dictator reciprocation decreased to 12% for strategy method elicitation 
and 10% for decision method elicitation. That is considerably less than our 41% decision 
method elicitation. We chose the decision method because prior studies had shown that 
the strategy method may not be a reliable tool to measure reciprocity. Fehr et al. (2003) 
concluded that the strategy method is less emotionally arousing than the game method. 
Casari and Cason (2009) concluded that measured trustworthiness is lower using strategy 
method elicitation. Our results could also be stronger because people in China are less 
accustomed to giving by strangers. Hence, the surprise might cause them to reciprocate 
more.  
Lazear et al. (2011) also had a two stage dictator game with an uninformed 1
st 
dictator and a 2
nd dictator who could silently exit. They found significant silent exiting by 
the 2
nd dictator (31%), where we found none. However, they restricted the choice set of 
1
st dictators to either (7,5) or (6,6), which meant that 1
st dictators could only give 14% of 
their endowment. This would have made an important difference in our experiment where 
only one of our 22 1
st dictators transferred less than 14%. Limiting the amount of giving 
by 1
st dictators could induce a norm/reference point for the 2
nd dictator to follow. More 
importantly, such a ceiling on giving would limit the gratitude that the 2
nd dictators could 
feel. Furthermore, if “type preference” as introduced by Gul and Pesendorfer 2010 was a 
motive for the 2
nd dictators’ giving, then 1
st dictators’ signal of the generosity of their type 
would be hampered. Under such a restricted choice, a specific 2
nd dictator could only 
know that their paired 1st dictator was not mean. That might warrant only a similar lack 
of meanness from the 2
nd dictator – silent exiting. Furthermore, the lowered ex post belief 
of the 1
st  dictator, which could have been anticipated by the 2
nd dictator should the 2
nd 
dictator not silently exit, would induce less guilt aversion in the 2
nd dictator, decreasing  
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the amount of giving when 2
nd dictator does actually not silently exit. Small amounts of 
money may also have counter intuitive incentive effects as suggested by Gneezy and 
Rustichini (2000).   
There are several possible limitations to our study. First, we assumed like Stanca et 
al. (2007) but did not prove that by not informing 1
st dictators about the possibility of the 
2
nd dictator reciprocating, we had diminished the ex ante 2
nd order belief of the 2
nd 
dictator that the first dictator was expecting reciprocation. We did survey for the counter-
factual beliefs of the 2
nd dictator of about 1
st dictator beliefs had the 1
st dictator known 
about the 2
nd round. Unlike Ellingsen et al. 2010, this was highly significantly correlated 
with actual 2
nd dictator reciprocation. This is evidence that ex-post beliefs mattered, and 
therefore, could drive guilt driven reciprocity, as we suggested was a limitation of Stanca 
et al. (2007) with respect to testing our gratitude hypothesis.  
This significant correlation, though would not be additional evidence for guilt based 
reciprocity. 2
nd dictator giving and 2
nd order counter-factual beliefs could have been 
driven by the amount and the implied beliefs of 1
st dictator giving. In other words, the 2
nd 
dictator gave more when he had more to give, not only because he believed that 1
st 
dictator expected more. We could not separate the independent effects of endowment and 
implied beliefs on 2
nd dictator giving. 2
nd order beliefs and the endowment had a 
correlation of 0.93. The consequent multi-collinearity yielded no significant regression. 
What the correlation does suggest is that the 2
nd order beliefs would have been a 
confound for the apparent generosity of 1
st dictator giving had the counter-factual world 
been true, supporting our and Stanca et al. (2007)’s results that people might reciprocate 
more when they do not believe that the reciprocation had been expected. The 2
nd order  
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beliefs of trustees in the control group confirmed results from CD 2006. These were 
correlated with trustee giving at less than 1% level of significance when regressed on 
both 2
nd order beliefs and the endowment from the trustor. 
Second, our silent exiting for 2
nd dictators was implicit. 2
nd dictators were told that 
1
st dictators were uninformed about the existence of the 2
nd round. Furthermore, they 
were told that the 1
st dictators would not be told that the money was from them, the 2
nd 
players, should they choose to reciprocate. To see that this implies silent exiting, note that 
the statement which rules out silent exiting, “1
st dictator will be told that you did not give 
back anything” would be inconsistent with the spirit and the letter of this instruction
5. In 
any case, the effect of guilt should be weaker than in either standard trust games or in 
Stanca et al.’s design, if not eliminated. Third, the double-blindness in our experiment 
was also implicit and unannounced. We simply had no identifiers for 2
nd dictators’ 
identity on the envelopes they submitted for giving. We chose not to make our double-
blindness more salient in order to avoid possible demand effects (George Loewenstein, 
1999). Furthermore, Barmettler et al. (2011) found no difference between implicit 
double-blindness and explicit double-blindness. If the double-blindness was not salient, 
then subjects might still feel some shame from “appearing” ungrateful before 
experimenter, in which case, it would be a 2
nd order reaction to gratitude. The use of 
implicit silent exiting and double-blindness should in any case have decreased both 
shame and guilt and hence should not have led to significantly increased rates of 
reciprocation in our treatment, if shame and guilt were the cause.  
                                                 
5  The exact statement was “They were not told about the existence of this round. That means, when player 
1 made their choice (to give to you), Player 1s were not told the amount they transferred will be multiplied 
by 3 and plus 5. They were also not told that you can pay them back in this round. They will not be told 
that the money is given by you.”  
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Third, we also had a small number of observations. However, our results should be 
read as a partial replication of Stanca’s et al. As was suggested in the introduction, our 
hypothesis was corroborated as the driver of the contra-guilt data in Ellingsen et al. (2010) 
and in Reuben et al. (2009), and in the apparent conflict between their main results.  
Fourth, we leave for future work how to reconcile gratitude and guilt within a 
general model of reciprocity. As mentioned in the introduction, our strong result when 
guilt was suppressed suggests that gratitude is not merely a substitute for guilt, but can be 
“crowded out” by guilt. How this crowding out occurs and what determines whether a 
person feels gratitude or guilt is beyond the scope of this paper. However, one possible 
reason for our results is that part of gratitude is motivated by “type preference.” 2
nd 
dictators might like to give more to those 1
st dictators who gave them more because 2
nd 
dictators prefer to give more to people who have shown themselves to be more altruistic. 
To test this, Lin and Ong 2011 introduced a 3
rd dictator (30 subjects) who observed 1
st 
dictator giving to 2
nd dictator, and could give to 1
st dictator from 3 exogenous levels of 
endowment: 6, 20, 32 CNY. They also had implicit and explicit double-blindness and 
silent exiting treatments. They found that 3
rd player giving correlated with 1
st dictator 
giving but not with endowment when regressed on both in all cases except for the 6 CNY 
explicit double-blindness and silent exiting treatment. In that case the correlation was 
inverted. They suggest that this could be a demand effect interacting with the small 
endowment. They also found no difference between explicit and implicit double-
blindness except for the 6 CNY. Their result supports our result, and suggests that type 
preferences contributed to reciprocation in our experiment. Thus, their result seems to 
address the limitations we mentioned above in regards to separating the belief from  
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endowment effect, and the saliency of implicit double-blindness and silent exiting, and 
sample size. 
In summary, our results suggest that guilt and inequity aversion are unnecessary for 
reciprocation. Gratitude can also drive reciprocation. We found greater reciprocation 
when guilt was ruled out, suggesting that guilt might crowd out gratitude. Our result 
could help explain opposing results in Ellingsen et al. (2010), Reuben et al. (2009). The 
opposing belief dependent incentives would make experiment sensitive to setup. Our 
strong positive reciprocity result also suggests why it has been difficult to find in the past.  
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